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Introduction 
D uring the two decades that followed the Diplomatic Conference which drafted the four 1949 Geneva Conventions for the Protection oj War Victims1 
there was comparatively little activity directed towards the codification or 
extension of the reach of the law ofwar.2 The only such activity in the 1950's 
was the drafting of the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection oj Cultural Property 
in the Event oj Armed Conjlict.3 This Convention was undoubtedly a response to 
the rapacious actions of agents of Hitler and Goering in German-occupied 
territories during World War II. 4 Among other things, it specifically prohibits 
the pillage of objects of arts and the use of cultural objects for purposes exposing 
them to the dangers of damage or destruction. The United States has not ratified 
this Convention but there are indications that it is tending towards such action 
in the foreseeable future. 
In 1967 the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities oj States in the Exploration 
and Use oj Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies was opened 
for signature.5 Article IV (1) of that Treaty prohibits the placing in orbit around 
the Earth of any nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction or their 
installation on any celestial body. The second paragraph of that article, in effect, 
demilitarizes the moon and other celestial bodies. 
The only other activity in this field in the 1960's was the 1968 Convention on 
the Non-Afplicability oj Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against 
Humanity. This Convention was approved by the General Assembly of the 
United Nations at a time when it was feared that the criminal statute of 
limitations of the Federal Republic of Germany would soon preclude that nation 
of continuing its program of prosecutions for war crimes committed by German 
nationals during the course of World War II? It is of interest to note that in 
that Convention the definition of "crimes against humanity" was extended with 
the specific additions of apartheid and genocide.8 Once again, the United States 
has not ratified this Convention and it would appear that it has no intention of 
so doing. 
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During the decade of the 1970's four conventions were drafted which resulted 
in major additions to the law of war. 
There were: 
1. 1971 Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and 
Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and 
the Subsoil Thereof (better known as the Seabed Convention);9 
2. 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and 
Stockpiling of Bacteriological (BiologicaQ and Toxin Weapons and on Their 
Destruction {better known as the Baderiological Convention);10 
3. 1976 Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use 
of Environmental Modification Techniques (better known as the ENMOD 
Convention); 11 and 
4. 1977 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 
and Relating to the Protection of Vidims of International Armed Conflicts 
(protocol I) {better known as the 1977 Additional Protocol 1).12 
And while the decade of the 1980's, and the 1990's to date, have not been 
so prolific, the importance of the few decisions reached during those two periods 
cannot be overstated. In 1980 a Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the 
Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious 
or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (with three Protocols) {better known as the 
Conventional Weapons Convention)13 was drafted; and in 1993 agreement was 
finally reached on a Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, 
Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destrudion.14 It is with these 
latter six Conventions that we will now concern ourselves. It is, perhaps, 
appropriate to point out at this time that several of these Conventions were 
drafted by the Conference on Disarmament which meets in Geneva on a more 
or less permanent basis and under a variety of tides. However, that does not 
lessen their impact on the law of war. The various 1907 Hague Conventions15 
which contain much of the basic codified law of war were drafted by a so-called 
"Peace Conference"; and many law-of-war conventions, such as the 1925 
Geneva Protocol,16 the 1936 London Submarine Protocol,17 etc. were drafted by 
disarmament conferences-but this did not lessen their impact on the law of 
war. 
Seabed Treaty 
Article I of the 1971 Seabed Treaty Provides that States Parties thereto 
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undertake not to emplant or emplace on the seabed and the ocean floor and in 
the subsoil (thereof beyond the outer limit of a seabed zone) ... any nuclear 
. 18 
weapons or any other types of weapons of mass destruction .... 
This prohibition does not apply to the territorial waters of coastal States, but 
under Article II it does apply to the "seabed zone" which includes all places 
beyond the twelve-mile limit as measured in accordance with the provisions of 
the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone. 19 In effect, the 
Seabed Treaty prohibits the laying of nuclear mines or other nuclear weapons 
under the waters of the high seas. 
Article III of this Convention contains the verification provisions. Every State 
Party to the Treaty has "the right to verify through observation" the activities 
on the seabed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof of every other State 
Party "provided that observation does not interfere with such activities"; and a 
State Party may, ifit deems it necessary, refer the matter to the Security Council 
of the United Nations. Inasmuch as such activities will necessarily be taking 
place on the seabed and ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof beyond the 
territorial waters of any coastal State, this means that it will be taking place under 
the waters of the high seas. The "right" thus granted appears to be more or less 
meaningless as it would exist even without the treaty grant. In fact, in view of 
the provision that the observation may not interfere with a State's activities on 
the seabed, it may even be argued that the provision, rather than assisting in 
verifying compliance, protects the State engaged in illegal activities from 
observation as it may label any such observation as "interference". Similarly, 
every State Party to the Treaty would have the right to have recourse to the 
Security Council of the United Nations if it had evidence that another State 
Party was violating the provisions of the Treaty even without a specific provision 
granting that right. It can be seen that in drafting this article the draftsmen were 
more concerned with ensuring that it could be said that the Treaty included a 
verification provision than with drafting a meaningful provision on the subject. 
The United States is a Party to this Treaty. It will be necessary at some point 
to reach a decision as to whether it prohibits the use of nuclear warheads on 
such weapons as the CAPTOR of the United States Navy, a weapon which lies 
on the seabed and discharges a torpedo only when activated by the passage of a 
submarine, a torpedo which is capable of carrying a nuclear warhead. 
Bacteriological Convention 
While we usually refer to the 1925 Geneva Protocol as the instrument 
prohibiting the use of asphyxiating gases, actually it prohibited the use not only 
of asphyxiating gases but also of "bacteriological methods of warfare". In 1972, 
being unable at that time to reach agreement on a more comprehensive 
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combined chemical-bacteriological weapons convention, a convention was 
signed by which the States Parties to it agreed to prohibit the "development, 
production and stockpiling" of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons, 
and further agreed to destroy all such weapons then in their arsenals.20 With 
"use" already prohibited, this means that the States Parties have, in effect, agreed 
that no such weapons could be or would be available in any future war. 
Once again, Article VI of this Convention, dealing with verification, leaves 
much to be desired. It provides for the lodging of a complaint with the Security 
Council of the United Nations with respect to any alleged violation of the 
provisions of the Convention and includes an undertaking by any State Party to 
the Convention to cooperate in any investigation thereafter initiated by the 
Security Council. Unfortunately, such an investigation can, of course, be 
prevented by a veto in the Security Council; and a number of States have 
heretofore found it expedient to disregard mandates of the Security Council and 
undoubtedly will do so in the future when they believe that such action is in 
their national interest-which, of course, it will be when they are the actual 
violators of the Convention and are being investigated. 
The United States is a Party to this Convention. Strange to relate, all of the 
"non-law-abiding States", with the exception of Syria, have found it appropriate 
to became Parties to this Convention. To what extent they can be expected to 
comply with its provisions is debatable?! 
ENMOD Convention 
By Article I of the 1976 ENMOD Convention a State Party thereto has 
undertaken 
not to engage in military or any other hostile use of environmental modification 
techniques having widespread long-lasting or severe effects as the means of 
destruction, damage or injury to any other State Party. 
Article II defines environmental modification techniques as "any technique 
for changing-through the deliberate manipulation of natural processes-the 
dynamics, composition or structure of the Earth." Although Article III of the 
Convention specifically provides that it does not apply to environmental 
modifications techniques for peaceful purposes, a number of States have 
apparently failed to ratify this Convention for fear that, despite that specific 
provision, they will be accused of a violation of the Convention and of a hostile 
act, if, for example, they seed a cloud in order to cause rain to fall over an arid 
area of their territory, when, had that action not been taken, the cloud might 
have provided much-needed rain on the territory of a neighboring State. 
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Problems with respect to the objectives and application of the Convention 
and with respect to charges of violations thereof are covered in Article V which 
provides for the establishment of a Consultative Committee of Experts to solve 
the former and for resort to the Security Council of the United Nations to pass 
on the latter. An Annex to the Convention sets out the functions and rules of 
procedure of the Consultative Committee. The provisions with respect to the 
Security Council are, with a few unimportant exceptions, identical with those 
contained in the 1971 Bacteriological Convention, discussed above. 
Because of the technical nature of this Convention, the draftsmen deemed it 
appropriate to reach a number of "understandings" which are not a part of the 
Convention itse1£22 These understandings include definitions of the terms 
"widespread", "long-lasting", and "severe" used in Article I; and an illustrative 
list of examples of the phenomena referred to in Article II. 
The United States is a Party to this Convention?3 
1977 Additional Protocol I 
Mter negooatlOns conducted during 1974, 1975, 1976, and 1977, a 
Diplomatic Conference convened by the Swiss Government was finally 
successful in completing the drafting of the 1977 Additional Protocol I, the primary 
purpose of which was to provide protection from the hazards of war to the 
persons not protected by the 1949 Geneva Conventions: the civilian populations 
in the unoccupied territory of the belligerent States?4 Unfortunately, primarily 
because of a certain group of provisions of that Protocol, many States, including 
France, Great Britain, and the United States, have not ratified it. 
The Preamble to this Protocol contains a statement to which the United 
States fully subscribes. After referring to the international agreements containing 
the rules of the law of war, it states that these rules 
must be applied in all circumstances to all persons who are protected by those 
instruments, without any adverse distinction based on the nature or origin of the 
armed conflict or on the causes espoused by or attributed to the Parties to the 
conflict. 
This is a complete rejection of the doctrine of the '~ust war", espoused by 
some nations, under which the law of war is binding upon their enemy, always 
the aggressor, while it is not binding upon the victim of aggression, always 
onesel£ 
Article 1 of the Protocol is concerned with when it is applicable. Paragraph 
4 of that Article states: 
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4. The situations referred to in the preceding paragraph include anned conflicts 
in which peoples are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation 
and against racist regimes. . . . 
Prior to this provision the conflicts therein referred to had been considered 
to be internal conflicts, civil wars to which the international law of war did not 
apply. This provision, with its corollary provisions in Articles 43 and 44, is one 
of the main objections of the United States, and other States, to this Protocol. 
Ever since the unratified 1874 Declaration cif Brussels2S four requirements for 
a person to be a legal combatant have been repeated in convention after 
convention. He must: 
1. be commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates; 
2. wear a fixed distinctive emblem recognizable at a distance; 
3. carry his arms openly; 
4. conduct military operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war. 26 
Article 43(1) of the 1977 Additional Protocol I only partially follows the 
historical precedent in that it requires the armed forces of a belligerent to have 
a responsible commander (Item 1 above) and to enforce the law of war (Item 4 
above). Then Article 44(3), after stating that there are occasions when an armed 
combatant cannot distinguish himself from the non-combatant civilian 
population, permits him to retain his status as a legal combatant with the sole 
requirement that he carry his arms openly 
1. during each military engagement; and 
2. during such time as he is visible to his adversary while engaged in a 
military deployment preceding an attack. (This is a very limited 
application ofItem 3 above). 
There is no requirement that combatants wear "a fixed distinctive emblem 
recognizable at a distance"--or any other kind of distinctive marking (Item 2 
above). Obviously, these provisions of the Protocol put the civilian population 
at risk in order to give additional protection to members of national liberation 
movements. And Article 44(4) provides that if a combatant (read that as "a 
member of a national liberation movement") fails to comply with the modest 
requirements of the provision concerning the carrying of arms openly, while he 
will not be entided to the status of a prisoner of war, he will be entided to all 
the protection to which a prisoner of war is entided.27 There is no explanation 
of the difference between 1. having the status of a prisoner of war; and 2. not 
having that status but, nevertheless, having all of the protection to which a 
prisoner of war is entided. In their demand for the protection of members of 
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national liberation movements the Third W orId States gave these individuals, 
even when illegal combatants, more protection than the legal, uniformed 
b . 28 com atant recelves. 
Once again, problems arose when the Conference attempted to draft a 
verification provision. It ended with a very lengthy Article 90 entitled 
"International Fact-Finding Commission, the Commission being tasked with 
the chore ofinvestigating complaints of grave breaches or other serious violations 
of the fOUI 1949 Geneva Conventions and of the 1977 Protocol I. The main 
objection here is that it is applicable only to those States which have filed a 
statement accepting the jurisdiction of the commission.29 
There are a number of provisions of this Protocol which are either a 
codification of the customary international law of war or are much-needed 
additions to that law. For example, Articles 35 and 55 are attempts to protect 
the natural environment from the effect ofwar.30 Article 51 prohibits attacks 
on the civilian population; prohibits attacks which have as their primary purpose 
the spreading of terror among the civilian population; prohibits target-area 
bombing; and prohibits reprisal attacks against the civilian population. Article 
52 prohibits attacks on civilian objects which are not military objectives, as well 
as reprisals against such objects which are not military objectives, as well as 
reprisals against such objects. Article 53 prohibits attacks on historic monuments, 
works of art, and places of worship, as well as reprisals against such places. Article 
54 provides that "Starvation of civilians as a method of warfare is prohibited" 
and then lists specific sources offood and water supplies indispensable to civilian 
life which are not to be attacked, even by way of reprisal. 
On a number of occasions officials of the United States Government at the 
policy-making level have indicated that this country accepts many of the 
provisions of the Protocol as binding law?1 However, neither the Reagan nor 
the Bush Administrations sent the Protocol to the Senate for that body's advice 
and consent to ratification by the President.32 Whether the Clinton 
Administration will do so remains to be seen-so far it has not done so but there 
are rumors that it is engaged in another review of the Protocol in order to 
determine whether it should be sent to the Senate for the latter's advice and 
consent to ratification and, if so, what understandings or reservations should be 
included. 
Conventional Weapons Convention 
During the early 1970's a conference of government experts convened by 
the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) drafted a list of 
conventional weapons which were believed to require consideration because 
they appeared to cause unnecessary suffering or to be indiscriminate in their 
effect. There were: 
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1. Small calibre projectiles; 
2. Blast and fragmentation weapons; 
3. Time-delay weapons Qand mines and booby traps); 
4. Incendiary weapons; and 
5. Potential weapons development.33 
In 1977, near the conclusion of the Diplomatic Conference which ultimately 
drafted the 1977 Additional Protocol I, that Conference adopted a resolution 
recommending that another conference be held to draft "~rohibitions and 
restrictions on the use of specific conventional weapons". 4 The General 
Assembly of the United Nations thereafter convened such a Conference. It met 
in 1979 and 1980 and drafted the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the 
Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious 
or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, to which three Protocols were attached. 
The Convention itself is merely an "umbrella" convention containing 
administrative provisions applicable to all three of the substantive Protocols. 
Article 1 makes the Convention and the Protocols applicable in "any situation 
described in paragraph 4 of Article 1 of Additional Protocol I"; and Article 7(4) 
elaborates on that provision by providing how a State Party to this Convention 
may become bound by it vis-a-vis a national liberation "authority". Paragraph 4 
of Article 1 of the 1977 Additional Protocol is as we have already seen, one of the 
major reasons why the United States has not ratified that Protocol. However, 
with respect to the 1977 Additional Protocol I a major objection was that it served 
as the basis for Article 44(3) of that instrument which removed from members 
of national liberation movements the historic requirements for legal combatants 
and it was argued that this gave protection to terrorists. That problem does not 
arise with respect to this Convention or its Protocols. When the United States 
ratified this Convention, it made a reservation with respect to Article 7(4)(b). 
(France made reservations to several of these provisions, including Article 
7(4) (b»?5 
Article 4 of this Convention, dealing with ratifications, is rather unique. It 
requires that in ratifying the Convention a State must also ratify at least two of 
the three attached Protocols. And, finally, Article 8 of the Convention provides 
for the calling of a review conference by the Parties thereto ten years after the 
effective date of the Convention if none has been called prior to that date. That 
ten-year period has now expired and it is expected that the review conference 
will meet in September 1995. 
It is in the Protocols themselves that important provisions of the law of war 
are contained. Protocol I is entitled Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of 
Non-Detectable Fragments. It prohibits the use of any weapon "the primary effect 
of which is to injure by fragments which in the human body escape detection 
by X-ray". It was directed primarily against weapons made of such materials as 
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glass and plastic. It was completely non-controversial, probably because, as one 
of the United States Delegates has said, "no one seems to have had any serious 
military interest in such weapon,,?6 A Canadian Delegate has stated that this 
Protocol "bans a weapon which does not exist,,?7 It was the fear that States 
would only ratify the Convention and its Protocol I that caused the adoption 
of the provision in Article 4 of the Convention requiring the ratification of two 
or more of the Protocols. Actually, that fear does not appear to have been 
justified. As of31 December 1992, thirty-five States had become Parties to the 
Conventional Weapons Convention and all but Benin and France had ratified all 
three Protocols. Benin approved Protocols I and III and France ratified Protocols 
I and 11.38 
Protocol II is concerned with Prohibitions and Restrictions on the Use of Mines, 
Booby Traps and Other Devices. It is to be noted that Article 1 makes it clear that 
its subject matter is limited to land mines only. That article specifics that its 
coverage includes "mines laid to interdict beaches, waterway crossings or river 
crossings" but that it "does not apply to the use of anti-ship mines at sea or in 
inland waterways". 
Article 2 of this Protocol contains two very important definitions, among 
others: 
"mine" means any munition placed under, on or near the ground or other surface 
area and designed to be detonated or exploded by the presence, proximity or 
contact of a person or vehicle; "remotely delivered mine" means any mine 
delivered by artillery, rocket, mortar or similar means or dropped fonn an aircraft. 
Of course, the foregoing provision with respect to "remotely delivered 
mines" would also apply to the weapons of warships. 
The second definition of interest is that relating to booby traps. It states: 
"Booby-traps" means any device or material which is designed, constructed or 
adapted to kill or injure and which functions unexpectedly when a person disturbs 
or approaches an apparently harmless object or performs an apparently safe act. 
Of particular interest is the fact that there is a list of ten categories of articles 
the booby-trapping of which is prohibited. These categories include objects 
specially designed for children, including toys, a type of booby trap widely used, 
with grim results, in Mghanistan. 
Another category worthy of note is 
kitchen utensils, or appliances except in military establishments, military locations 
or military supply depots. 
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The unit cook is an important person. He must be warned of the possibility 
oflegal booby traps so that he will take care in adding enemy kitchen utensils 
to his collection! 
Other important provisions concerning mines are those requiring the 
recording of information with respect to the location of mine fields. Not only is 
this subject covered in several articles of Protocol II, but there is a Technical 
Annex containing guidelines for such recording. 
There are special provisions in Article 8 of Protocol II for the protection of 
United Nations forces and missions from minefields, mines, and booby traps. 
When one reads of the relief trucks which have been the victims of buried mines 
on much-traveled roads both in Somalia and in Bosnia, the need for such 
provisions becomes obvious-but that they will be complied with appears to be 
questionable. 
One final provision which is of major importance is contained in Article 9. 
It provides for various procedures, both national and international, to be 
followed upon the cessation of hostilities in order to "remove or otherwise 
render ineffective, minefields, mines and booby traps placed in position during 
the conflict". After World War II there was an "International Agreementfor the 
Clearance of Mines in European Waters",39 but there was no equivalent agreement 
with respect to land mines. Mter those hostilities had ended the French kept 
well over one hundred thousand German prisoners of war engaged in the task 
of mine removal on French territory, with many casualties, as a result of which 
the 1949 Geneva Third Convention specifically prohibits such action.40 For many 
years after the end ofW orld War II there were civilian mine casualties in North 
Africa. And even at this late date there are almost daily casualties caused by land 
• • 11.£ h· 41 rrunes In.lUg arustan. 
It is clear that land mines have become one of the major problems of the 
world as we approach the Twenty-First century. It is also clear that this Protocol 
is entirely inadequate for the protection of mankind from a weapon that has 
assumed the role of the major hazard to the civilian population.42 There is 
pressure for an international agreement for the complete prohibition of the use 
ofland mines and at least some strong limitations on their use appears to be just 
over the horizon. 
Let us now turn to Protocol III-Protocol on Prohibitions and Restrictions on the 
Use of Incendiary Weapons. This was undoubtedly the most controversial of the 
three Protocols. It contains only two articles, the first dealing with definitions 
and the second with the protection of civilians and civilian objects. (It should 
be emphasized that the primary objective of both Protocols II and III is 
protection of civilians.) Incendiary weapons are defined as 
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any weapons or munition which is primarily designed to set fire to objects or to 
cause bum injury to persons through the action of flame, heat, or combinations 
thereof, produced by chemical reaction of a substance delivered on the target. 
The definition goes on to specifically exclude from its coverage weapons 
which have incidental incendiary effects and combined effects munitions 
(CEMs). Although the word "napalm" was heard frequendy during the 
discussions, that word will not be found in the Protocol itsel£ 
Article 2(1) states that 
it is prohibited in all circumstances to make the civilian population as such, 
individual civilians, or civilian objects the object of attack by incendiary weapons. 
There can be no objection to this provision. Civilians, and civilian objects 
not being used for military purposes, should not be the objects of any type of 
attack, incendiary or non-incendiary. 
Article 2(2) prohibits air-delivered incendiary attacks on military objectives 
located within a concentration of civilians. This provision is, perhaps, overly 
broad, as many important military objectives, such as national command and 
communication centers, are frequendy located within a concentration of 
civilians; and many types of major military objectives, even when originally built 
away from concentrations of civilians, are soon to be found surrounded by 
concentrations of civilians. Decisions in this regard should be based on the 
principle of proportionality.43 Of course, if, as a matter of military tactics, 
another type of air-delivered weapon can be just as effective in destroying such 
a military objective, for example, the so-called "smart-bomb", it should be the 
weapon selected. 
Article 2(3) prohibits attacks on military objectives within a concentration of 
civilians by incendiary weapons, other than those which are air-delivered, 
"except when such military objective is clearly separated from the concentration 
of civilians and all feasible precautions are taken.,,44 As only a small number of 
military installations are "clearly separated" from concentrations of civilians, 
once again the doctrine of proportionality should be applied. 
Article 2(4) is undoubtedly a throwback to Vietnam and the defoliation 
program employed there by the United States. It provides: 
It is prohibited to make forests or other kinds of plant cover the object of attack 
by incendiary weapons except when such natural elements are used to cover, 
conceal or camouflage combatants or other military objectives, or are themselves 
military objectives. 
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There does not appear to be anything contained in this Protocol which would 
be so restrictive on military operations as to justify the refusal of the United 
States to ratify it; and if there is any such provision, surely it could be taken care 
of by an understanding or, if deemed necessary, by a reservation.45 Nevertheless, 
the President transmitted only the Convention and Protocols I and II to the 
Senate for its advice and consent to ratification, accompanied by a statement to 
the effect that action on Protocol III was being deferred pending further 
. . 46 exanunatlOn. 
Chemical Weapons Convention 
It will be recalled that in 1925 the Geneva Protocol was drafted and that it 
was subsequendy widely accepted by States.47 It is important to emphasize that 
this Protocol prohibited "use" only. As a result many States ratified it with what 
was known as the "First-Use Reservation". What this meant was that most 
nations engaged in the development, production, and stockpiling of chemical 
and bacteriological weapons in order to be prepared to retaliate in kind should 
a future enemy make first use of such weapons. 
While, as we have seen, in 1972 it was found possible to draft a convention 
prohibiting the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological 
weapons, the problem of chemical weapons long continued unsolved, primarily 
because of the difficult question of verification. It was not until September 1992 
that a Drqft Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling 
and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction was finally submitted to the 
General Assembly of the United Nations. In February 1993 that organization 
approved the Convention and submitted it to the States for ratification or 
accession. It is far lengthier and more complex than its bacteriological brother. 
In fact, it is probably the most complex law-of-war convention ever drafted. 
Let us study a few of its highlights. 
Article I is the heart of the Convention. By it each State party undertakes 
that it will never under any circumstances: 
1. Develop, produce, or otherwise acquire or stockpile chemical weapons, or 
transfer such weapons to "anyone"; 
2. Use chemical weapons; or 
3. Engage in any military preparations to use chemical weapons. 
That article contains these further undertakings by each Party: 
1. To destroy any chemical weapons that it owns or possesses or that are located 
within its jurisdiction; 
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2. To destroy any chemical weapons that it has abandoned on the territory of 
another State Party; and 
3. To destroy any chemical weapons production facilities that it owns or possesses 
or that are located within its jurisdiction. 
Finally, that Article provides that "Each State Party undertakes not to use riot 
control agents as a method ofwarfare"-and therein lies the problem as far as 
the United States is concerned. When the United States finally ratified the 1925 
Geneva Protocol in 1975 there was an agreement between the President and the 
Senate that an Executive Order would be issued covering the subject of riot 
control agents. The Executive Order which was issued provides that the United 
States renounced the first use of herbicides except for certain limited purposes; 
and then lists four situations in which it will use riot control agents in war: 
1. In riot conditions in areas under US military control including for the control 
of rioting prisoners of war; 
2. In situations in which civilians are used to mask or screen attacks; 
3. In rescue missions in remotely isolated areas of downed airmen and escaping 
prisoners of war; and 
4. In rear echelon areas to protect convoys from civil disturbances, terrorists, and 
ramili
. .. 48 pa tary orgaruzatJons. 
It is to be assumed that in ratifying the Convention the United States will 
continue to insist on the legality of the use of riot control agents in those four 
situations despite the very adverse reception that such claim encountered during 
the drafting process. 
Article II contains a large number oflengthy definitions. Of particular interest 
is the fact that research and development of methods of protection against toxic 
chemicals and chemical weapons is not prohibited. Article III is a rather unusual 
provision. Within thirty days of ratification or accession a State Party must make 
a number of declarations concerning its ownership of chemical weapons, their 
location, its program of destruction, etc. Articles IV and V are concerned with 
the destruction of chemical weapons and the closing and destruction of chemical 
weapons production facilities, respectively. Article VII establishes an elaborate 
permanent organization to oversee and verify compliance with the Convention. 
Article IX establishes the methods by which verification by an organ of the 
Organization may be obtained. These methods include what is termed 
"Challenge Inspections"-an on-site inspection by members of the Technical 
Secretariat of the Organization requested by any State Party which believes that 
there is non-compliance by another State Party. (There is also a 100-page 
"Verification Annex" which fleshes out various parts of the Convention proper). 
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Article XII is entitled "Measures to Redress a Situation and to Ensure 
Compliance; Including Sanctions". 
Apparently, while the United States is not enamored with all of the provisions 
of the Convention or of the Verification Annex, and particularly with the 
wording of some of them, it will accept the entire document as written with a 
reservation with respect to riot control agents mentioned above. What action, 
if any, with respect to this Convention will be taken by the "non-law-abiding 
States" mentioned above remains to be seen-but it would probably be unwise 
to expect them to become Parties to it, or to comply with it if they do become 
P . 49 ames. 
Conclusion 
It may safely be said that while law-of-war activity during the first half of the 
Twentieth Century was notable for the numerous 1907 Hague Conventions, the 
1925 Geneva Protocol, and the four 1949 Geneva Conventions, the second half of 
that century was characterized by a melange of much-needed international 
legislation relating to a variety of unrelated aspects of this field. 50 It is perhaps 
being overly optimistic to look forward during the balance of this century to 
the widespread adoption of a Convention on the Prohibition oj the Development, 
Production, Stockpiling and Use oj Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons oj Mass 
Destruction and on Their Destruction. However, such an event is not as unlikely as 
it once was. On 3 September 1993 the World Health Organization (WHO) 
requested an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice on the 
following question: 
In view of the health and environmental effects, would the use of nuclear 
weapons by a States in war or other armed conflict be a breach of its obligations 
under intemationallaw including the WHO Constitution?51 
Then on 15 December 1994 the General Assembly of the United Nations 
adopted Resolution 49/75 entitled "Request for an Advisory Opinion from the 
International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear 
Weapons". The question posed by the General Assembly asks: 
Is the threat or use of nuclear weapons in any circumstance pennitted under 
intemationallaw?52 
Both of those matters are presently pending before the Court. Should the 
Court decide the former affirmatively, and the latter negatively, the possibility 
of an international convention implementing those decisions and totally 
prohibiting not only the threat or use of nuclear weapons, but their very 
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existence, would be gready enhanced and the law-of-war activities of the latter 
half of the Twentieth Century would truly have a major place in history. 
Unfortunately, it can be assumed with more than a reasonable degree of certainty 
that were such a fortuitous event to occur, a number of present-day, or potential, 
possessors of nuclear weapons would fail to become Parties to such a 
convention-or would become Parties with the preconceived idea of violating 
their agreement and thereafter being in a position to hold the non-nuclear world 
hostage. 
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